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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
trial it should be remembered that a demand for a possible special
use need not necessarily be shown before the jury can consider it as
indicative of worth. Illinois Light & Powcr Co. v. Bedard, 343 111.
618, 175 N. E. 851 (1931). And property should not be deemed
worthless, as respects compensation of the owner in eminent domain
proceedings, merely because he allows it to go to waste or is unable
to put it to any use, Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson,
98 U. S. 403 (1878).
J. W. B.
EVihENCE-EARSAY-SPNTANEOUS ExcLAAUION.-Plaintiff
was injured when struck by a truck driven by an employee of defend-
ant. In an action to recover damages for personal injury, witnesses
were permitted "on the theory that it was part of the res gestae" to
testify over objection that they heard a fellow employee of the driver
who was in the truck with him say. imediately following the acci-
dent, that he told the driver just before the accident that he was
driving too fast. After verdict and judgment for plaintiff., admis-
sion of such statement in evidence was assigned as error. Held, not
crror to admit the statement. Judgment affirmed. Jones v. Am-
brose, 38 S. E. (2d) 263 (W. Va. 1946).
The subject of res gestae is in theory simple. Every circum-
stance or declaration which grows out of the main transaction, is
contemporaneous with it, and serves to illustrate its character, is
admissible. Cf. State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 122, 43 S. E. 230 (1902) ;
Sample v. Consolidated etc. Co., 50 W. Va. 472, 40 S. E. 597 (.1901).
Relevant circumstances not consisting of statements may usually be
proven, but when accompanying utterances are offered to prove the
truth of the facts asserted, a more difficult problem is presented.
By the orthodox view, hearsay statements are admissible as part of
the res gestae if (1) there is some nonverbal act that is itself admis-
sible under the issue, (2) the statements characterize or explain the
act and (3) the statements and the act accompany each other, i. e.
are contemporaneous. Sample v. Consolidated, etc., Co., 50 W. Va.
472, 40 S. E. 597 (1901) ; Hardman, ,Spontaneous Exclamation v.
Res Gestae (1918) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 341. Declarations merely nar-
rative of a past occurrence, though made ever so soon after the event,
cannot be received as proof of the event since they are not contem-
poraneous with the main transaction. Hawker v. Balitmore & Ohio
R. R., 15 W. Va. 628 (1879); Corder v. Talbot, 14 W. Va. 277
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(1878). Yet courts have admitted utterances under the badge of
res gestae even though statement and act were not strictly contem-
poraneous, Jack v. Mutual Reserve Fund Ass'n, 113 Fed. 49, 53 (C.
C. A. 5th 1902); Industrial Commission v. Diveley, 88 Colo. 190,
294 Pac. 532 (1930.) The statements are deemed admissible "as
part of the res gestae" where they appear to be spontaneous and a
sincere response to actual sensations produced by excitement from
the transaction in issue. Collins v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 122 W.
Va. 171, 8 S. E. (2d) 825 (1940) ; Slarcher v. South Penn Oil Co.,
81 W. Va. 587. 95 S. E. 28 (1918). As the cases show the true basis
for admitting spontaneous statements related to some exciting cause
is their superior trustworthiness to ordinary hearsay. For this
reason Wigmore objects to the phrase res gestae as being too vague.
See 6 wVIG-MORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1745. He reasons that two
classes of utterances are admissible in this connection-the sponta-
neous utterance, admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, and
the verbal act which never came within it. The latter consists of
statements accompanying otherwise equivocal acts and characteriz-
ing them, the statement thus being part of the act. The admissibility
of the spontaneous statement as an exception to the hearsay rule is
based on the experience that, under the stress of excitement, the re-
flective faculties may be stilled and the utterance would thus be the
sincere unreflecting expression of the speaker's belief as to the facts
observed by him. In the instant case, on this analysis, the statement
not having been made at the time of the act (the res gestiac) but an
unascertained length of time before the lime element would seem to
prevent its being part of the rcs gestae. but since it was made in re-
spo se to the excitement caused by the excessive speed at which the
truck was running just before the accident, it would be admissible
as a spontaneous utterance. Cf. Mercer Funeral Home v. Addison,
111 W. Va. 616, 163 S. E. 439 (1932). It has been suggested that
if utterance before as well as those at or after the act are to be ad-
mitted indiscriminately as res gestae, if made under the existence of
an exciting cause, this vague term might well be discarded as the
badge of admissibility and the spontaneous exclamation test, which
provided a rational basis for the admissibility of such statements,
applied. See Hardman, supra at 346; cf. Morgan, A Suggested
Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae (1922) 31
Ymn L. J. 229.
C. W .W., JR.
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